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A BURDEN TOO HEAVY: BERGHUIS v. SMITH 
AND THE FADING RIGHT TO A JURY FROM 
A FAIR CROSS-SECTION OF THE 
COMMUNITY 
Thomas R. Neumeier* 
Abstract: In November of 1993, Diapolis Smith was convicted of second 
degree murder by an all-white jury in Kent County, Michigan. On appeal, 
Smith challenged the constitutionality of Kent County’s jury-selection 
procedure, claiming he had not been afforded his Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. This 
Comment examines Smith’s claim and argues that the Supreme Court ul-
timately erred in ruling that Smith failed to make a prima facie case for a 
Sixth Amendment claim. First, this Comment argues that Smith pre-
sented sufficient evidence for the Court to draw a reasonable inference, 
under Duren v. Missouri, that Kent County’s jury-selection procedures sys-
tematically excluded African Americans. Second, in the face of extensive 
academic research that demonstrates the nexus between socioeconomic 
disparity and minority underrepresentation on juries, this Comment ar-
gues that the Supreme Court should be more amenable to claims that 
hinge on the presence of socioeconomic factors. Finally, this Comment 
addresses the consequences of the Berghuis v. Smith decision and the solu-
tions to minority underrepresentation in jury venires. 
Introduction 
 On March 30, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court in Berghuis v. Smith 
(Berghuis II ) reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Smith v. Berghuis 
(Berghuis I ).1 Almost twenty years prior to the Court’s decision, Diapolis 
Smith was convicted of second-degree murder by an all-white jury in 
Michigan’s Kent County.2 He was sentenced to life with the chance of 
parole.3 At voir dire, Smith challenged the racial composition of the 
venire panel from which the jury was selected.4 The court denied his 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 Berghuis v. Smith (Berghuis II ), 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1396 (2010), rev’g 543 F.3d 326 (6th 
Cir. 2008). 
2 Id. at 1387. 
3 Id. at 1389. 
4 Id. 
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objection, and on appeal, Smith claimed a violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the com-
munity.5 Specifically, Smith alleged that Kent County’s jury-selection 
procedure lent itself to the consistent underrepresentation of African 
Americans in jury venires.6 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted 
Smith a new trial because the Michigan Supreme Court failed to follow 
clearly established federal law.7 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rely-
ing on Duren v. Missouri, ruled that Smith had failed to prove a crucial 
prong of the Duren test, namely that the exclusion of African Americans 
in Kent County was systematic.8 
 This Comment argues that the Supreme Court erred in holding 
that Smith failed to make a prima facie case for a Sixth Amendment 
claim. Part I provides an overview of the Berghuis decision. Part II dis-
cusses the errors in the decision.9 First, it argues that Smith provided 
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. at 1387, 1389; see U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court made its first refer-
ence to the right to be tried by a jury composed of a fair “cross-section” of the community 
in Thiel v. South Pacific Co. See 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court 
repeated the key phrase from Thiel and solidified it as a constitutional principle, stating 
that “the fair-cross-section requirement is violated by the systematic exclusion of wom-
en . . . .” See 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975). 
6 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1388. 
7 Smith v. Berghuis (Berghuis I ), 543 F.3d 326, 345 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 1382 
(2010). The standard that governs a federal court’s review of a state court’s decision is 
limited by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 
104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1218, 1219 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006)); 
Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 334. The relevant language from the AEDPA is as follows: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings un-
less the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)resulted in a 
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Sixth Circuit found that the Michigan Supreme Court had un-
reasonably applied U.S. Supreme Court precedent, namely, Duren v. Missouri. Berghuis I, 
543 F.3d at 345; see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 (1979) (holding that Mis-
souri’s practice of allowing all women an automatic exemption from jury service violated 
the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the com-
munity); infra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Duren). 
8 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1395; see also Duren, 439 U.S. at 366 (defining “systematic ex-
clusion” as exclusion that is inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized); infra 
Part II. 
9 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1395 (indicating the defendant-respondent bears the 
burden of demonstrating unequivocally the nexus between factors contributing to under-
representation and actual underrepresentation); infra Part II. 
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sufficient evidence to link Kent County’s jury-selection procedures with 
undisputed and consistent underrepresentation of African Americans 
in jury venires.10 Second, in light of the extensive research connecting 
minority underrepresentation in jury venires with socioeconomic dis-
parity, Part II argues that the Court should be amenable to Sixth 
Amendment claims that hinge on the presence of socioeconomic fac-
tors.11 Finally, Part III addresses the consequences of Berghuis II and po-
tential solutions to the problem of minority underrepresentation in 
jury venires.12 
I. Factual and Procedural Background in Berghuis 
 The State charged Smith with a variety of felony offenses after his 
involvement in a shooting during a nightclub brawl in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan on November 7, 1991.13 Almost two years later, an all-white 
jury convicted Smith of second-degree murder as well as possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony.14 Before the jury was sworn, 
Smith’s lawyer challenged the racial composition of the jury venire, a 
pool of sixty to one-hundred potential jurors, of whom no more than 
three were African Americans.15 The trial court denied the challenge; 
after his conviction, Smith appealed the trial court’s ruling on the issue, 
arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.16 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 344.  
11 See Hayward R. Alker et al., Jury Selection as a Biased Social Process, 11 Law & Soc’y 
Rev. 9, 10 (1976) (discussing findings that support the hypothesis that jury-selection pro-
cedures discriminate against racial minorities).  
12 See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (discussing consequences of 
systematic underrepresentation); Seymour Wishman, Anatomy of a Jury: The System 
on Trial 268 (1986) (discussing remedies to systematic underrepresentation of minorities 
in jury venires).  
13 Berghuis I, 543 F.3d 326, 329–30 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010). That 
night, Christopher Rumbley was shot during a bar brawl. Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1389 
(2010). As the Supreme Court noted, witness accounts of the event were numerous, if not 
consistent: “Thirty-seven witnesses from the bar, including Smith, testified at the trial. Of 
those, two testified that Smith fired the gun. Five testified that the shooter was not Smith, and 
the remainder made no identifications of the shooter.” Id. 
14 Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 329. Significantly, a panel of fourteen venirepersons, including 
two alternates, as well the twenty-three who had been excused, were all white. Brief of Re-
spondent at 3, Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010) (No. 08-1402). 
15 Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 330. 
16 Id.; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (applying the fair cross-
section requirement to a Sixth Amendment claim); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 
(1946) (invoking, for the first time, the “cross-section” concept). 
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 During an evidentiary hearing ordered by the Michigan Appeals 
Court, the trial court applied the appropriate standard for a Sixth 
Amendment claim set out in Duren.17 In order to have satisfied his bur-
den of proof under Duren, Smith would have been required to show the 
following: 
“(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ 
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this 
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and 
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection proc-
ess.”18 
The trial court found that, although African Americans did constitute a 
distinctive group and were consistently underrepresented in Kent Coun-
ty venires, Smith failed to show that their underrepresentation was sys-
tematic.19 
 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, 
finding that Smith had satisfied all three prongs of the Duren test.20 Spe-
cifically with regard to whether systematic exclusion of African Ameri-
cans had occurred, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that the jury-
selection process in Kent County had contributed to the underrepresen-
tation.21 The State then appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, 
which unanimously reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision.22 
Reluctant even to grant Smith the first two elements of the Duren test, 
the Michigan Supreme Court stated it would give him “the benefit of 
the doubt on unfair and unreasonable underrepresentation.”23 Never-
theless, the court then ruled unequivocally that Smith had failed to sat-
                                                                                                                      
17 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1389; see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) 
(laying out the prima facie case for a Sixth Amendment claim). 
18 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1388 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). 
19 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1385; see also Duren, 439 U.S. at 366 (applying the systematic 
exclusion prong of the test). In Duren, the petitioner met the requirement of showing sys-
tematic underrepresentation. 439 U.S. at 366. The petitioner demonstrated that the sub-
stantial underrepresentation of women occurred “in every weekly venire for a period of 
nearly a year,” which indicated to the Court that “[the] cause of the underrepresentation 
was systematic—that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized.” Id.  
20 People v. Smith, No. 172558, 1999 WL 33445050, at *3–5 (Mich. Ct. App. May 07, 
1999), rev’d 615 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Mich. 2000). 
21 Id. at *5. 
22 People v. Smith, 615 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Mich. 2000). 
23 Id. at 3. 
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isfy the third prong of Duren.24 As Justice Cavanagh noted in his concur-
rence, the dearth of evidence showing that the Michigan circuit courts 
were, in fact, more afflicted by minority underrepresentation than the 
state’s district courts was fatal to Smith’s claim.25 
 Smith filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming that he had 
been denied his constitutional rights to equal protection and due proc-
ess because the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a systematically exclu-
sionary jury-selection process in Kent County.26 The Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Smith relief and, like 
the Michigan Supreme Court, found that Smith had failed to prove sys-
tematic exclusion in Kent County.27 
 Smith appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision.28 According to the Sixth Circuit, Smith had satisfied each of 
the three prongs of the Duren test.29 Specifically with respect to the sys-
tematic exclusion prong, which the Michigan Supreme Court held 
Smith failed to satisfy, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Smith’s showing of 
consistent underrepresentation of African Americans on Kent County 
jury venires, combined with evidence that the underrepresentation was 
not random, was enough to demonstrate systematic exclusion under 
                                                                                                                      
24 Id. The Michigan Supreme Court stated, “[T]he influence of social and economic 
factors on juror participation does not demonstrate a systematic exclusion of African 
Americans. The Sixth Amendment does not require Kent County to counteract these fac-
tors.” Id. A hypothetical posed in the Brief of the Respondent, however, tends to rebut this 
presumption. Brief of Respondent, supra note 14, at 54 (arguing that if a jury-selection 
system notified potential jurors strictly via e-mail, even though it could be proven that mi-
norities had less access to the internet, the system would be exclusionary regardless of any 
contributing socioeconomic factors). Simply because the source of exclusion is rooted in 
socioeconomic factors does not make the procedure itself any less exclusionary. See Berg-
huis I, 543 F.3d at 341–42.  
25 See Smith, 615 N.W.2d at 12 (Cavanagh, J., concurring). Smith alleged that so-called 
“siphoning” of African American jurors from circuit to district court venires contributed to 
the underrepresentation of African Americans in Kent County juries. Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1388; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 332. According to the juror-selection procedure in Kent 
County, inner-city district courts received jurors before the surrounding circuit courts, 
without subsequent replenishment of the jury pool. Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1388. The 
Kent County Court Administrator corroborated that this procedure led to underrepresen-
tation of African Americans in jury venires when she testified to her belief that the specific 
arrangement of jury selection between district and circuit courts contributed to the un-
derrepresentation. Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 342. 
26 Petition for Habeas Corpus, Smith v. Berghuis, No. 1:03-CV-87, 2006 WL 461248 
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 2006). 
27 Berghuis, 2006 WL 461248, at *1, rev’d 543 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 
1382 (2010). 
28 Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 345. 
29 Id. at 344. 
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Duren.30 Citing United States v. Rogers, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that it 
was highly improbable that African American underrepresentation on 
juries was a mere coincidence, and this improbability created a reason-
able inference of systematic exclusion.31 The State of Michigan ap-
pealed and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.32 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s review of Smith’s claim was necessarily 
limited in scope.33 Because Smith’s Sixth Amendment claim came with-
in the purview of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA), the Court merely had to decide if the Michigan Su-
preme Court’s ruling was either (1) contrary to clearly established fed-
eral law, as construed in Supreme Court precedent, or (2) based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts presented at trial.34 On the 
crucial issue of systematic exclusion, the Court stated that Duren “hardly 
establishes . . . that Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.”35 The 
facts presented at trial, however, contradict this conclusion.36 Although 
the underrepresentation of African Americans in jury venires in Berg-
huis II was not as severe as that in Duren, Smith’s evidence of consistent 
underrepresentation sufficed to show that it was inherent in Kent 
County’s jury-selection process.37 
                                                                                                                      
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 340; see also United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The ex-
tremely low probability that the underrepresentation would have occurred by chance 
alone provides further evidence that the system itself contributed to the lack of African 
American participation in the venire pools.”). 
32 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1382. 
33 Id. at 1385. 
34 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006); supra note 7. 
35 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1392. 
36 See Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 26. Smith linked African American un-
derrepresentation in jury venires with Kent County’s practice of sending potential jurors 
to district courts before circuit courts. Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 332. Smith also demonstrated 
that Kent County’s leniency in granting hardship excuses disproportionately affected Afri-
can American representation in jury venires. Id. at 332–33. 
37 See Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 344; see also Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. In Duren, the petitioner 
argued that women were underrepresented in the Jackson County, Missouri, jury pool. 439 
U.S. at 360. The petitioner proved that, although women made up 54% of the jury-eligible 
population, they accounted for only 26.7% of the summoned jurors, and only 14.5% of 
those on the postsummons weekly venires. Id. at 362. Concededly, the underrepresentation 
of African Americans in Kent County was not as severe, but this does not render Smith’s 
case incapable of coming within the scope of Duren, on account of the AEDPA’s limita-
tions. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003) (“[The AEDPA] permits a federal 
court to grant habeas relief based on the application of a governing legal principle to a set 
of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.”). 
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II. Applying Duren and Drawing a Fair Inference 
 In Duren v. Missouri, the Court defined systematic exclusion as “in-
herent in the particular jury-selection process utilized.”38 Accordingly, 
evidence that consistent underrepresentation of a particular group in 
jury venires is not random supports an inference that systematic exclu-
sion exists.39 The proof of systematic exclusion that Smith presented at 
trial demonstrated a causal link between the jury-selection process and 
the underrepresentation of African Americans in Kent County jury ve-
nires.40 
A. Evidence at Trial and Smith’s Arguments 
 In his Supreme Court brief, Smith linked the underrepresentation 
of African Americans in Kent County jury venires with particular char-
acteristics of the county’s jury-selection process.41 First, Smith argued 
that Kent County’s practice of assigning jurors to inner-city district 
courts prior to assigning them to the surrounding circuit courts caused 
consistent underrepresentation of African Americans in the circuit 
courts’ venires.42 Because renewal of the jury pool did not occur at any 
point during the process, fewer African Americans were available to 
serve as jurors for circuit courts.43 
 Second, Smith argued that Kent County’s particular leniency in 
granting excuses for those who wished to opt out of jury service dis-
proportionately affected African American representation in jury veni-
res.44 Smith argued that African Americans were more likely to seek 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979). 
39 See United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 1996). 
40 See Berghuis I, 543 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010). 
41 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1394 (2010); Brief of Respondent, supra note 14, at 
3–11. In his brief, Smith provided convincing statistical evidence that African Americans 
were consistently underrepresented in jury venires. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 14, 
at 11. Smith demonstrated that in the seventeen months before his trial, African Ameri-
cans were underrepresented on Kent County venire panels by at least fifteen percent, in 
the six months before his trial by eighteen percent, and in the month of his trial by thirty-
four percent. Id. at 10–11. 
42 Brief of Respondent, supra note 14, at 46. 
43 See id. at 47. 
44 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1389. Smith’s statistician and demographics expert testi-
fied that in Kent County, sixty-four percent of African American households with children 
were headed by single parents, while only nineteen percent of Caucasian households were 
run by single parents. Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 340--41. Therefore, as the Sixth Circuit rea-
sonably concluded, allowing an excuse for the “inability to find child care with no ques-
tions asked” would likely affect African American representation in jury venires. Id. at 341. 
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and receive excusals from service and that Kent County failed to take 
any action to counteract this incongruity.45 
 As to Smith’s first argument regarding the order of selection be-
tween district and circuit courts, the Supreme Court found that Smith 
failed to show that African Americans were represented any less in state 
circuit court venires than district court venires.46 For the Court, Smith’s 
attempt to demonstrate a nexus between the lack of African Americans 
in the circuit court venires and Kent County’s jury-selection process fell 
short.47 Indeed, the Court questioned how Smith could make a siphon-
ing argument at all when he provided no evidence of a disparity.48 
 Perhaps such an empirical showing would have helped Smith’s ar-
gument, but its absence is hardly fatal to his claim.49 Eighty-five percent 
of the African Americans living in Kent County resided in Grand Rap-
ids, Michigan, where municipal courts’ jury pools were filled first.50 Af-
ter the jury pools at the district court level were filled, the pool of po-
tential jurors was not renewed, despite the fact that many African 
Americans had already been selected to serve on district court juries.51 
 The Circuit Court Administrator’s revision of the jury-selection 
procedure a month after Smith’s trial corroborated the allegation that 
inner-city district courts siphoned African Americans away from circuit 
court venires.52 The procedural correction reversed the priority be-
tween district and circuit courts so that circuit courts received jurors 
first.53 The change was motivated by the administrator’s observation of 
consistent underrepresentation of African Americans in circuit court 
venires.54 From these two factors—the county’s failure to take into con-
                                                                                                                      
45 Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 332, 340–41. 
46 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1394. 
47 See id. at 1388, 1394. 
48 See id. 
49 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 363, 366--67; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 342–43 (“The systematic 
exclusion requirement as discussed in Duren . . . does not mean that a defendant’s proof 
must be unequivocal . . . but instead, the proof must be sufficient to support an inference 
that a particular process results in the underrepresentation of a distinctive group.”). 
50 Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 330–31. 
51 See id. at 342. The effects of this practice were compounded by the fact that “once an 
individual was assigned to a district court venire, he or she was not placed back on the 
qualified list for the circuit court because of a statutory exclusion for individuals who 
served on a jury in the previous twelve months.” Id. 
52 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1384; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 332. 
53 Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 332. 
54 Id. at 342. Kim Foster, the Kent County Court Administrator, stated during the evi-
dentiary hearing that Kent County “revised the juror assignment policy ‘based on the be-
lief that the respective districts swallowed up most of the minority jurors, and [the] circuit 
court was essentially left with whatever was left, which did not represent the entire coun-
 
2011 The Fading Right to a Jury from a Fair Cross-Section of the Community 77 
sideration the geographical distribution of African Americans and the 
deliberate ex post revision of the jury-selection process—the Court 
should have drawn a reasonable inference of systematic underrepresen-
tation.55 The Supreme Court erred in refusing to make this inference 
by substituting its own assessment of the underrepresentation for that 
of the Circuit Court Administrator who recognized and corrected it.56 
 As to Smith’s second argument alleging an overly lenient excuse 
policy and procedure, the Supreme Court similarly found his reasoning 
unconvincing.57 Again, the Court did not believe that Smith had dem-
onstrated a sufficient nexus between the underrepresentation and the 
jury-selection procedures.58 The Court stated, “No ‘clearly established’ 
precedent of this Court supports Smith’s claim that he can make out a 
prima facie case merely by pointing to a host of factors that . . . might 
contribute to a group’s underrepresentation.”59 
 Unfortunately, however, the Court’s rejection of Smith’s second 
argument is a mischaracterization of both his reasoning and Supreme 
Court precedent.60 Implicit in the Court’s opinion is the principle that 
Smith had to prove unequivocally that Kent County’s willingness to 
grant hardship excuses disproportionately affected African American 
representation in jury venires.61 The appropriate inquiry, however, 
                                                                                                                      
ty . . . .’” Id. Richard Hillary, director of the Kent County Public Defender’s Office and Co-
Chair of the Jury Minority Representation Committee of the Grand Rapids Bar Associa-
tion, also testified at the evidentiary hearing that he repeatedly noticed a paucity of Afri-
can Americans in Kent County jury venires. Id. at 332. Specifically, Hillary testified that the 
Jury Minority Representation Committee had “studied the phenomenon and determined 
that [Kent County was] losing minorities by choosing the District Court jurors first and not 
returning the unused ones to the . . . pool that the Circuit Court was taken from.” Id. at 
342. The Supreme Court provided no clear explanation as to why it chose to substitute its 
own judgment of the causes of underrepresentation for that of the court personnel who 
observed underrepresentation firsthand, had grounds to believe it was systematic, and 
acted deliberately to counteract the system’s flaws. See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1394. 
55 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 363, 366--67; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 342–43. 
56 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1394; Duren, 439 U.S. at 363, 366–67; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d 
at 342–43. In Duren, the petitioner never provided unequivocal proof that the jury-
selection procedures led to women’s underrepresentation in venires. See 439 U.S. at 363, 
366–67. Instead, it was the petitioner’s “undisputed demonstration that a large discrepancy 
occurred not just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year 
[which] manifestly indicat[ed] that the cause of the underrepresentation was systematic—
that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized.” Id. at 366. Thus, the 
Court in Duren inferred that the underrepresentation of women was systematic because it 
was consistent. See id. 
57 Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1395. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
60 See id.; Duren, 439 U.S. at 357; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 339–41. 
61 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1395. 
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should have been whether the presence of certain procedural factors 
created a reasonable inference that the system itself led to African 
American underrepresentation.62 
B. Academic Support 
 A wealth of academic research exists that demonstrates the ten-
dency of American jury-selection procedures to exclude minorities 
from venires.63 Although the Supreme Court could not have consid-
ered this research independently of the specific facts in Berghuis II, its 
existence certainly supports a reasonable inference that Kent County’s 
processes resulted in the underrepresentation of African Americans in 
jury venires.64 If the Supreme Court had applied its precedent properly, 
it would have found that Kent County’s practice of filling district court 
before circuit court juries, coupled with its lenient juror-excuse policy, 
created a reasonable inference of systematic exclusion of African Amer-
icans from circuit court juries.65 In so doing, the Court would have con-
firmed what academics have known for decades.66 
 The major hypothesis in the relevant research is the so-called 
“Middle American Bias.”67 Essentially, research shows that middle-class 
Caucasians are historically overrepresented in jury venires.68 The rea-
sons for this phenomenon are numerous, but many are systematic in 
nature.69 For example, according to Alker, Hosticaka, and Mitchell, two 
of the more problematic features of jury systems, which contribute to 
minority underrepresentation, are reliance on voter registration lists— 
an issue not present in Berghuis—and the discretionary excuses granted 
                                                                                                                      
62 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 357; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 339–41. 
63 See Alker et al., supra note 11, at 10 (discussing findings in support of the hypothesis 
that jury-selection procedures discriminate against racial minorities); Robert A. Carp, Fed-
eral Grand Juries: How True a “Cross Section of the Community,” 7 Just. Sys. J. 257, 261 (1982) 
(compiling evidence that African Americans and Hispanics are underrepresented to a 
statistically significant degree in jury venires); Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Where Did Black Jurors 
Go? A Theoretical Synthesis of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury System and Jury Selection, 22 J. 
Black Stud., 196, 197–201 (1991) (discussing racial discrimination in jury-selection pro-
cedures); David Kairys, Juror Selection: The Law, a Mathematical Method of Analysis, and a Case 
Study, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 771, 771 (1972) (discussing the fundamental flaws in juror 
selection and the reasons for underrepresentation of the black, poor, and young in jury 
venires). 
64 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1396; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 342–43. 
65 See Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 342–43. 
66 See Alker et al., supra note 11, at 10; Carp, supra note 63, at 261; Fukurai et al., supra 
note 63, at 197–201; Kairys, supra note 63, at 771. 
67 Alker et al., supra note 63, at 10. 
68 See id. 
69 Id. 
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to jurors who wish to opt out of service.70 Relevant to Smith’s argument, 
in particular, is that “[s]election procedures that result in a spate of 
hardship excuses and exemptions” demonstrably undermine the fair 
cross-section requirement.71 Unless properly accounted for and po-
liced, such excuses introduce non-random factors that can chip away at 
a fair cross-section of the community.72 Additionally, because African 
Americans, such as those in Kent County, generally fall within a lower 
socioeconomic class than Caucasians, they tend to be underrepre-
sented to a statistically significant degree in jury venires.73 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id.; see also Joseph L. Gastwirth & Qing Pan, Statistical Measures and Methods for As-
sessing the Representativeness of Juries: A Reanalysis of the data in Berghuis v. Smith 14 
(Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, George Washington University, Working Paper 
July 3, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1529442 (“[T]he mas-
ter jury list in Kent County was not based on voter registrations but combined lists of hold-
ers of driver’s licenses or identification cards issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV) to non-drivers.”). 
71 Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 155, 
159 (1995); see also Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 n.25 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The dis-
proportionate utilization of juror excuses by a given group may have clear importance 
where the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross section requirement is involved.”). The Sixth Cir-
cuit recognized the systemic implications of juror excuse policies in the following manner 
in Berghuis I: 
If, for example, a county created a juror exemption or an excuse for renters 
where 90 percent of African-Americans in the county fell into that category, 
any resulting underrepresentation would clearly be “inherent in the system” 
inasmuch as the system made a socio-economic factor (i.e., renting) relevant 
to the makeup of the jury pool. 
See 543 F.3d at 341–42. In contrast, the Michigan Supreme Court implied that notifying 
jurors to appear by e-mail, even if African Americans have less access to e-mail than whites, 
would prove nothing because “‘the influence of social and economic factors on juror par-
ticipation does not demonstrate a systematic exclusion of African-Americans.’” Brief of 
Respondent, supra note 14, at 54 (quoting People v. Smith, 615 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. 2000)). 
72 See Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 341. Hardship excuses are often sought because of the 
length of time required for jury service as well as the “inefficiency and discomfort of the 
time spent at the courthouse.” Brief of Respondent, supra note 14, at 10. 
73 See id. at 9, 10 (stating that 31.5 percent of African Americans in Kent County lived in 
“Poverty Households,” compared to 6.7 percent of Caucasians); Sobol, supra note 71, at 159 
(arguing that overly lenient excuse policies can dramatically affect the fair cross-section of a 
jury pool); see also Wishman, supra note 12, at 271; Ajamu Dillahunt et al., State of the 
Dream 2010: Drained, Jobless and Foreclosed in Communities of Color, 9–11 (2010), 
available at http://www.faireconomy.org/files/SoD_2010_Drained_Report.pdf (stating that, 
as of 2009, African Americans earned sixty-two cents for every dollar of white income on 
average and that, as of 2007, African American families’ median income was almost thirty-
thousand dollars less than white families’ median income). As Seymour Wishman noted, 
The small fees mean that few people making more than the minimum wage can 
afford the low income imposed by jury service. . . . Only those with an employer 
who will continue to pay their salary can participate in jury service without a 
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 In addition to generally being of a lower economic class, other so-
cioeconomic characteristics of African Americans in Kent County could 
have contributed to their underrepresentation in jury venires.74 At trial, 
Smith’s demographics and statistics expert presented evidence that fifty-
nine percent of African Americans in Kent County were renters as op-
posed to homeowners, compared to only twenty-seven percent of Cauca-
sians.75 Also, thirty-two percent of African Americans in Kent County 
had moved within the last fifteen months, compared to twenty percent 
of Caucasians.76 Research demonstrates that mobility, as a characteristic 
of African Americans, is not unique to those in Kent County.77 
 As to the effects of mobility, Seymour Wishman writes, “[S]ome 
groups, like the poor, the young, and blacks, are more mobile than 
others and as a result of their mobility the jury-selection process is less 
inclusive.”78 Being more mobile increases the likelihood that an indi-
vidual will not receive a summons to serve on a jury or that the address 
the State has on record is no longer current.79 Thus, such research 
supports an inference that African Americans in Kent County, as a re-
sult of their higher mobility, are less likely to serve on jury panels than 
Caucasians.80 
 The extensive research in the area certainly corroborates the evi-
dence that Smith’s demographics and statistics expert presented at tri-
al.81 Indeed, Smith’s arguments reflected the conclusions to which 
countless social scientists have come on the issue of minority underrep-
                                                                                                                      
major economic sacrifice. This reduces the representativeness of the jury 
pool . . . . 
Wishman, supra note 12, at 9–11. 
74 Wishman, supra note 12, at 270; Fukurai et al., supra note 63, at 201–02. 
75 Brief of Respondent, supra note 14, at 10. 
76 Id. 
77 Wishman, supra note 12, at 270. 
78 Id. (“A study in the eastern part of Massachusetts found 41 percent fewer blacks on 
juries than justified by their population, and attributed this discrepancy, at least in part, to 
the residency requirement in the voter registration lists and the higher mobility of 
blacks.”). 
79 Id.; see Fukurai et al., supra note 63, at 202. 
80 See Wishman, supra note 12, at 270; Fukurai et al., supra note 63, at 202. 
81 See Wishman, supra note 12, at 270 (finding that African Americans are typically 
more mobile than other races and therefore are less represented in jury venires); Dilla-
hunt et al., supra note 73, at 4, 9–11; see also Hayward R. Alker & Joseph J. Barnard, Proce-
dural and Social Biases in the Jury Selection Process, 3 Just. Syst. J. 220, 230 (1977) (finding 
that, from the total eligible pool of black jurors, only three-quarters are actually selected 
for jury venires). 
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resentation on juries.82 Because Smith’s evidence was enough to estab-
lish a reasonable inference that Kent County’s jury-selection process 
systematically excluded African Americans, the Supreme Court should 
have allowed his Sixth Amendment claim.83 
III. Consequences and Solutions 
 The consequences of the Supreme Court’s error in Berghuis II are 
difficult to quantify.84 The Supreme Court’s statements in Ballard v. 
United States, however, provide valuable insight into the psychological 
influences of systematic underrepresentation in jury venires: 
[R]eversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice 
in an individual case. The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of 
an eligible class or group in the community in disregard of 
the prescribed standards of jury selection. . . . The injury is 
not limited to the defendant—there is an injury to the jury 
system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, 
and to the democratic ideal reflected in the process of our 
courts.85 
As the Court in Ballard intimates, when African Americans, or members 
of any other minority group, “find virtually no ‘peers’ on American ju-
ries,” they (quite understandably) lose confidence in the system.86 
 Ballard also suggests that there are practical legal consequences for 
defendants who face systematic underrepresentation within jury veni-
res.87 A fair cross-section of the community helps protect “against the 
exercise of arbitrary power” and “make[s] available the commonsense 
judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mis-
taken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-
conditioned or biased response of a judge.”88 The Supreme Court’s rul-
                                                                                                                      
82 See Alker et al., supra note 11, at 10; Carp, supra note 63, at 261; Fukurai et al., supra 
note 63, at 203; Kairys, supra note 63, at 771. 
83 See Berghuis I, 543 F.3d at 344. 
84 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1394 (2010); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 
195 (1946). 
85 Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195. 
86 Kairys, supra note 63, at 771; see also Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-
In-Chief, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 911, 920 (1996) (stating that the presence of African 
American jurors serves a symbolic role, representing “the fairness and the impartiality of 
the law,” which works to counteract the already-prevalent “racial critiques” of the U.S. 
criminal justice system).  
87 See Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195. 
88 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
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ing in Berghuis II, however, threatens to strip the fair cross-section re-
quirement of any practical significance.89  
 In essence, Berghuis II places a heightened burden of proof upon 
criminal defendants for Sixth Amendment claims.90 This heightened 
burden is especially problematic for criminal defendants when socio-
economic factors are inextricably linked to issues of proof.91 Requiring 
a criminal defendant to prove that minority underrepresentation on 
juries is the result of state procedures rather than simply providing suf-
ficient evidence from which a reasonable inference of systematic exclu-
sion may be drawn undermines the purpose of a right to a jury trial 
and renders the Sixth Amendment hollow.92 
 There are remedies that can impact jury-selection procedures, de-
spite Berghuis II, if courts are willing to apply Duren in a more meaning-
ful way.93 One remedy is to limit the number of excuses granted to po-
tential jurors, and instead allow for jurors to postpone their service to a 
time that is less taxing.94 On this point, Wishman has argued, “Where a 
request, even for hardship, really appears to focus on the inconven-
ience or imposition caused by a certain date, a postponement rather 
than an excuse should be granted.”95 Postponement accomplishes the 
twin goals of achieving a fair-cross section of the community as well as 
“increasing citizen satisfaction in the criminal justice system.”96 
 Other solutions are more technical; for instance, if a jury service 
“questionnaire is returned marked ‘deceased,’ ‘moved,’ or ‘addressee 
unknown,’ or if a questionnaire is not returned after a reasonable time, 
another questionnaire could be sent to an alternative first name at the 
next address on the list.”97 Also, eligible juror lists can be expanded and 
supplemented with other helpful lists, such as presidential registries, to 
include a broader cross-section of the community.98 Finally, at the very 
least, enforcement of summons for those who fail to return their jury 
questionnaires or show up for their day of service can be of great help.99 
                                                                                                                      
89 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1395; Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195. 
90 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1395. 
91 See id.; Berghuis I, 543 F.3d 326, 342–44 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010). 
92 See Berghuis II, 130 S. Ct. at 1395; Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195. 




97 Alker et al., supra note 11, at 39 (“A major source of bias against certain groups may 
be the use of outdated lists” because “neighborhoods tend to be racially homogenous”). 
98 Id. 
99 Sobol, supra note 71, at 228. 
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Not only will enforcement ensure a better cross-section of the commu-
nity, but it will provide a higher rate of compliance in the future.100 
Conclusion 
 The U.S. Supreme Court erred in its decision in Berghuis II. Diapo-
lis Smith provided sufficient evidence for the Court to draw a reason-
able inference of the systematic exclusion of African Americans from 
jury venires in Kent County, Michigan. Furthermore, extensive research 
corroborates the connection alleged by Smith—that socioeconomic 
disparity contributes to minority underrepresentation in jury venires. 
Rather than requiring Smith to prove the nexus between minority un-
derrepresentation in jury venires and state procedures, the Court 
should have properly applied its precedent in Duren v. Missouri and ac-
knowledged Smith’s argument—an argument that mirrors the perti-
nent social science literature. Finally, the Court’s decision in Berghuis II 
signals a continuation of the decline in confidence in the justice system 
and a heightened burden of proof for those alleging Sixth Amendment 
violations. Viable solutions, however, do exist for the problem of minor-
ity underrepresentation in jury venires, including postponement of 
service for those asserting hardship and enforcement of summons. 
These are only a few of the possible remedies, but small changes can go 
far in helping secure the right to a fair cross-section of the community 
in the jury box. The Berghuis II ruling confirms the need for change, 
and, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, court personnel 
must take every measure to restore confidence in every defendant’s 
right to a fair trial. 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. at 228–29. 
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